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The article addresses the question of the extent to which, and the reasons why, western European trade 
unions may have privileged the protection of ‘insiders’ over that of 'outsiders'. Temporary Agency 
Workers, among whom migrant workers are over-represented, are taken as test case of ‘outsiders’. The 
findings from a comparison of Belgian and German multinational plants show that collective agreements 
have allowed a protection gap between permanent and agency workers to emerge in Germany, but not 
in Belgium. However, the weaker protection in Germany depends less on an explicit union choice for 
insiders than on the weakening of the institutional environment for union representation and collective 
bargaining. The conclusion suggests that European unions are increasingly trying to defend the 
outsiders, but meet institutional obstacles that vary by country. 
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Introduction  
Over the last twenty years, debates on labour market reforms in Europe have often referred to an ‘insider-
outsider’ divide. The insider-outsider literature generally proposes that trade unions act as obstacles to 
the employment opportunities available to ‘outsiders’. The result is labour market dualisation, with only 
the insiders enjoying representation and dismissal protection. However, Palier and Thelen (2010) have 
moved the debate forward by arguing that dualisation stems from the weakening of trade unions rather 
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than from their intentional protection of insiders. Trade unions consent to reduced outsider protection 
only as a second-best solution, when their preferred option – increased protection for all – is no longer 
achievable because of the erosion in industrial relations, labour markets and welfare institutions.  
Dualisation may be seen as a globally emerging divide between classes, as in Standing’s distinction 
between the ‘salariat’ and the ‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011). A sociological analysis of the segmentation 
processes requires more attention to the variation of dualisation depending on social contexts. Firstly, 
dualisation is not only linked to employment status: it overlaps with socio-demographic as well as firm-
level internal and external structural features. The over-representation of migrants and women in non-
standard employment can explain the disadvantages of non-standard employees. Moreover, national-
level variables affect the form of dualisation, as evident in the case of female work (Vosko 2010). 
According to Häusermann and Schwander (2012), the likelihood of being an outsider also depends on a 
country’s welfare regime: in terms of gender and class, women in low-skilled service occupations are 
most likely to be outsiders, while the youth are negatively affected only in some regimes. Moreover, 
immigrants are over-represented in unemployment and atypical work in most countries (Emmenegger 
and Careja, 2012; Raess and Burgoon, 2013). At the firm level, flexible work arrangements such as 
temporary and agency labour are utilized to respond to sector-specific demand volatility and 
international market pressures.  
This article has three interrelated analytical aims. Firstly, through selected case studies within the same 
multinational companies affected by the same external pressures, it questions the role of efficiency-
driven or rational choice-based explanations for using one extreme form of vulnerable work, namely 
temporary agency work. The cases illustrate diversity in the organisation of the use of agency labour 
that cannot be explained by company variables alone and require the consideration of social and political 
factors. Secondly, the article explores some of these factors by comparing ‘most similar’ cases, i.e. two 
neighbouring ‘co-ordinated market economies’ with similar welfare state models, but where temporary 
agency workers are subject to very different degrees of protection. The comparison allows to identify 
the importance of union power and related collective bargaining, and representation systems, and 
thereby to assess Palier and Thelen’s (2010) argument more in depth. Thirdly, we go beyond existing 
institutional accounts by addressing agency and institutional factors together to tackle the underlying 
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question of the extent to which the unions’ role in co-organising dualisation depends on their political 
choices rather than on the environment they are in.  
The comparative perspective adds to the literature on labour market segmentation and on union 
responses (Benassi, 2013; Lillie, 2012; Doellgast and Greer, 2007; Hassel 2012), by looking in particular 
at the implications of power and the influencing factors. We propose to problematize the role of 
employers and trade unions beyond economic determinism and structural approaches that derive their 
roles merely from supposedly pre-existing interests. Instead, we pay deeper attention to the socio-
political context in which the actors operate and which they concomitantly construct. Thereby, we aim 
to contribute to debates on social inclusion and dualisation by stressing the crucial role of institutionally 
situated micro-political games, where actors are strategic ‘agents’ within a context of power relations.  
The article is organised as follows. Firstly, segmentation debates are addressed and the rationale of a 
Belgium-Germany comparison explained. Secondly, the German and Belgian regulations of temporary 
agency work are explained. Then, after a methodological note, the findings from matched case 
comparisons are presented and discussed in relation to agency and institutional factors. Finally, 
theoretical and policy implications are drawn 
  
Segmentation processes and trade union responses towards agency work in Germany and Belgium  
Since the 1970, there have been two main positions regarding the nature of labour market segmentation. 
On the one hand, efficiency-driven explanations interpret segmentation as the result of managerial 
efficiency-seeking strategies. Accordingly, the ‘core-periphery’ divide is supposed to reflect the 
productivity of the workforce and therefore to correspond to production requirements (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1971). Following Piore and Berger (1980: 24) dualism on the labour market exists when parts of 
the workforce are insulated from uncertainty and variability in demand – those are so-called ‘labour 
market insiders’. By contrast, ‘labour market outsiders’ are supposed to provide the demanded flexibility 
via atypical or flexible employment or unemployment. In this view, firms’ exposure to international 
competition, volatility of demand, standardised production processes, and degree of uncertainty are 
relevant factors shaping the need for flexible work arrangements from an employer perspective. On the 
other hand, power-based approaches claim that segmentation results from political processes rather than 
4 
 
efficiency-seeking strategies. Accordingly, labour market segmentation needs to be considered as a 
bargaining outcome. This is in line with sociological literature on trade unions and social inclusion, 
arguing that unions play an important role in shaping workforce structures, skills demarcation, and skill 
ladders (Grimshaw and Rubery, 1998). Traditionally, unions strive for bargaining outcomes limiting 
competition among workers in internal labour markets and allowing them to maintain control over skill 
supply and worker knowledge. These arrangements result from bargaining processes between labour 
and management and reflect the balance of power between them (ibidem). But when, and how, do they 
lead to dualisation?  
According to insider-outsider accounts (Rueda, 2014), flexible arrangements for workers serve as a 
buffer in the workplace, protecting the regular/permanent workers from fluctuations. Therefore, some 
scholars report that unionisation does not negatively affect the use of temporary agency workers 
(Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013). By defending their members’ interests (mostly insiders), unions 
protect them against employer demands while ignoring the interests of the non-members (mostly 
outsiders) ( Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Given the over-representation of insiders among the union 
rank-and-file, unions are expected to consent to increasing labour market flexibility for the outsiders 
while opposing changes that disadvantage insiders (Saint-Paul, 1996).  
Various studies have examined unions’ attitudes of inclusion and exclusion and the challenges agency 
work poses to them. Beyond the notion of ‘rational choice’, the concepts of ‘trade union identity’ 
(Hyman, 1995; Heery and Abbot, 2000) and ‘union traditions’ (Palier and Thelen, 2010; 2012) were 
used to indicate how unions can choose between being more or less inclusive in defining their 
constituencies, and more or less restrictive in the issues they pursue by adopting strategies of 
representation for atypical workers. It is often suggested that unions can contribute to reinforce 
segmentation, and this seems to be the case when unions fail to adequately oppose the creation of 
‘cheaper’ and more flexible jobs in the periphery through the relaxation of conditions for the use of 
flexible arrangements (Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009). A country where these dualisation processes have 
been particularly pronounced is Germany. During the 2000s, it liberalised temporary and agency work, 
while maintaining or even reinforcing the protection of permanent workers1 (Holst, 2013; Hassel and 
Schiller, 2010), causing a drastic increase in precarious work (Keller and Seifert, 2012). Moreover, at 
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company level ‘producer coalitions of export-oriented firms and core workers’ representatives’ have 
multiplied, contributing to dualism (Hassel, 2012). 
Co-ordinated market economies with ‘continental’ welfare states, alongside Southern European 
countries, are supposed to feature the most dualised labour markets among deindustrializing societies 
(Rueda, 2014). To examine the role of unions more precisely, the article investigates two extreme cases 
in terms of union strength within this group, Belgium and Germany. Despite belonging to the same 
general type of industrial relations system, the two countries differ in terms of union strength. Belgium 
has high union membership at around 50%, strong union representation, inclusive employment 
protection and strict collective bargaining regulations; by contrast, Germany has witnessed a deep union 
decline within the last twenty years (with unionisation falling below 20%) and labour market reforms 
multiplying the forms of atypical, less protected employment (Visser, 2013). Belgian unions are 
involved in social security management by handling unemployment benefits as typical part of the ‘Ghent 
system’ (Vandaele, 2006): this contributes to the relatively high union density, particularly among 
agency workers, who are unionised at nearly 60% (Arrowsmith, 2006). Additionally, Belgian unions are 
strongly present in the workplaces, especially in large firms, via union-dominated works councils, 
whereas German trade unions do not have formal control over works councils.   
Both countries have similar rates of agency work: 2.2% of employment in Belgium and 1.6% in 
Germany in 2007 (Eichhorst and Marx, 2012). While agency work has long been present in the Belgian 
labour market, it has only expanded after the labour market reforms of the early 2000s in Germany. 
Regulations differ markedly. Unlike in Belgium, in Germany there is no national minimum wage (only 
in 2014 it was decided to introduce one in 2015) and sectoral collective agreements are very rarely 
extended to all companies. A sectoral, hourly minimum wage for agency workers was only introduced 
in 2012, but at the relatively low level of €7.01/7.89/hour (East/West Germany). As of January 2014, 
the hourly wages increased to €7.86/8.50 (East/West Germany). Compared to this, the Belgian national 
minimum wage negotiated by national agreement was €9.12/hour in 2013, and the sectoral minimum 
wages in metalworking above €12/hour. Agency workers are legally covered by sector collective 
bargaining in Belgium, but not in Germany, where separate agreements for agency workers can be 
signed, often with significantly worse conditions (Eichhorst and Marx 2012; AUTHOR A and 
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AUTHOR C, 2013). The initial lack of attention by the main German unions to protect agency workers’ 
terms of employment opened up space for competing agreements, signed by fringe unions and in 
particular the Christian Unions (CGZP). By the end of the 2000s, one third of agency workers were 
covered by CGZP agreements, with wages around 30% lower compared to sectoral agreements for 
standard employees (Schröder, 2009; Meyer, 2013). 
The most problematic case is that of the German metalworking union IG Metall, which resisted 
temporary agency work for over twenty years, and only recently adopted a more inclusive strategy 
(Benassi and Dorigatti, 2014). In the workplaces, many works councils do not oppose atypical work, 
since it enhances flexibility for the firm and grants security to regular workers (Promberger, 2012). In 
contrast, the Belgian trade union confederations have been actively engaged in regulating atypical work, 
also incorporating local representatives to support their work. It appears that the German unions’ blanket 
resistance to flexibilisation, especially with respect to the regulations governing hiring and firing of 
atypical labour, prepared them badly to protect the employment conditions of agency workers. The result 
is deeper segmentation between the more and less protected workforces. This has important implications 
for welfare policy since it promotes a vicious circle with an ever lower share of social-contribution 
paying active workers, particularly during economic crisis. As Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst (2007) claim, 
atypical employment in Germany was fostered through gradual labour market reforms to enhance 
flexibility without threatening the stability of regular employment. Conversely, the Belgian unions 
actively engaged in regulating the use of flexible labour to a strong defence of all forms of contractual 
flexibility, with a consequent lessening of the segmentation effect. People who start in temporary jobs 
in Belgium mostly end up in permanent employment (Eurociett, 2012). 
To examine the reasons of the weaker protection of agency workers in Germany, we take a more detailed 
look at migrant workers and workers with migration background as prototypical ‘outsiders’ who are 
over-represented in agency work. Their precarious status has been reinforced in the current crisis, when 
unemployment has affected them more than German nationals (AUTHOR B et al., 2012). If the reason 
was a lesser commitment to inclusiveness by German unions in comparison to Belgium, this should be 
most visible in the case of policies towards migrant workers, given the strong ‘welfare chauvinism’ that 
prevails in European societies and especially in Germany (Emmenegger and Careja, 2012). However, 
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major European trade unions proactively support the rights of migrant workers and are generally in 
favour of the free movement of labour. This commitment is not always translated in policies and 
collective bargaining practices that protect migrant workers and workers with migration background 
effectively.  
 
Belgium and Germany: varieties of co-ordinated regulation of agency work  
While industrial relations are characterised by multi-employer bargaining and works councils in both 
Belgium and Germany, some important differences have implications for the outsider protection. 
Belgian sector-level agreements are usually extended to all companies, and the process of 
decentralisation is constrained by the 1968 labour legislation that does not allow sector- and company-
level deviations from higher-level collective agreements, except specific cases foreseen by the law. 
Deviations from sector agreements’ minimum wages are never allowed. Equal treatment between 
agency and core employees is stipulated by law and may refer to the sector- or company-level 
agreements covering the user firms. 
Because of their stable recognition by the government and the employers’ associations, Belgian trade 
unions were in a position to intervene in the policy-making arena for the protection of agency workers 
some twenty years earlier than their German counterparts. Although unions recognized that temporary 
jobs are more precarious than regular jobs, they have worked, together with the government and the 
employers, on an appropriate regulative framework for agency workers since the 1980s. In 1987 they 
welcomed the law regulating equality in social rights and entitlements to agency workers. Belgian 
unions have also been actively involved in enhancing the working conditions of agency workers through 
the negotiation of sector- and firm-level agreements. Particularly, CSC/ACV and FGTB/ABVV have 
contributed to introduce action plans and training to inform agency workers about their rights, 
particularly in the metalworking sector.  
Conversely, German sector agreements are rarely extended to all companies (never in metalworking), 
putting more cost pressures on companies that are covered. As a result, decentralisation has progressed 
faster and deeper, especially during the 1990s and 2000s, with ‘opening clauses’ allowing companies to 
deviate from collectively-agreed wages and working conditions through agreements with the works 
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councils. Moreover, agency workers are institutionally under-represented in the works councils: they 
are entitled to vote for the user company’s works council only after three months of work, and cannot 
be elected (in Belgium, agency workers take part in union delegate elections alongside the user 
company’s workforce, and in theory can also be elected if they work in the company for 100 days over 
a twelve-month period).  
In Germany, the equal treatment principle applies but, unlike in Belgium, is subject to deviation by 
collective agreements. This opened the door for separate, worse collective agreements for agency 
workers, deviating from the equal treatment principle set by law.  
We attempt to understand why German union practices are so different from the Belgian ones. After 
their long opposition to agency work, German unions were forced to change their attitudes because of 
the high unemployment and the unsustainable approach of labour shedding in the 1990s (Holst et al., 
2010). In particular, the main union confederation DGB deleted its request for a legal prohibition of 
agency work from its policy program in 1996, and in 1998 started to discuss how to put agency work on 
the bargaining agenda. In 2002 the German law on agency work was amended (Hassel and Schiller, 
2010). Representatives of IG Metall and the service sector union Ver.di (responsible for temporary work 
agencies) were involved in the commission (known as ‘Hartz Commission’) that prepared the reform. 
They contested the possibility to deviate from equal treatment, but failed to mobilise against it. Separate 
collective agreements with worse conditions for agency workers started then to be signed with the fringe 
union CGZP, while the number of agency workers in Germany climbed from 300,000 in 2004 to more 
than 900,000 in 2012 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2013). During the run-up to the labour market opening 
to the new EU member states in 2011, the DGB feared that such agreements could even be signed with 
foreign trade unions at East-European wage levels, and therefore started demanding a national minimum 
wage and easier extension of collective agreements. 
In December 2010, the Federal Labour Court ruled that the Christian Trade Union Confederation CGZP 
had no collective bargaining capacity and its separate agreements for agency workers were declared 
invalid, reducing, but not eliminating the space for a ‘race to the bottom’ in the agency sector. In 
between, in the metal sector, which registered the highest concentration of agency workers, IG Metall 
started to campaign alongside Ver.di to organise agency workers, who had been hit very 
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disproportionately by the 2008-9 crisis. The organising effort represents a strategic shift by German 
unions, but the priority of collective bargaining action remains. In the metal and electrical industry, the 
2012 sector agreement introduced some improvements: pay premiums for agency workers depending 
on the duration of work in the same establishment, the obligation to offer fixed-term employment after 
two years of working for the same user firm, and a work council entitlement to negotiate (but not veto) 
the use of agency workers. The new IG Metall secretary, elected in 2013, had admitted that ‘IG Metall 
as a whole was conceptually unprepared to develop instruments to protect agency workers from the 
sudden economic crisis’ (Wetzel, 2012: 202) but also claimed that with the subsequent organising 
campaigns ‘we [IG Metall] have become the union of agency workers’ (ibidem, 190).  
Hence, although both Belgian and German trade unions currently proclaim an inclusive approach 
towards agency workers, they differ in their practice. When agency work emerged, Belgian unions 
became actively involved and immediately pushed for regulation, whereas German unions tried to 
restrict it for a long time. Differences in the unions’ institutional embeddedness (Penninx and Roosblad, 
2000) are possible explanatory variables. As the following sections will underline, these differences are 




The article brings together two studies following different methods. Firstly, the Belgium-Germany 
comparative analysis, whose rationale was explained above, draws from matched case studies. Two US-
based multinationals (manufacturing) were selected for investigation. The four subsidiaries located in 
Germany and Belgium were similar in terms of production characteristics, the nature of the production 
process, technology, unionisation (relatively high) and size. In all plants, the production process was 
driven by an automated assembly line, with workers performing manual assembly functions. This rigid, 
continuous production process provided few opportunities for management to cluster the agency 
workers apart from permanent employees. Therefore, agency and regular workers were involved in both 
core and non-core production functions and worked side-by-side. The company names are kept 




[Table 1 here] 
 
All workplaces have coped with the crisis, with the German workplaces experiencing intensive 
restructuring due to competition and cost pressures. As illustrated in table 1, according to expert 
estimations from the interviews, migrant workers are over-represented among agency workers in all 
plants, as in the metalworking industry generally but especially in Germany, mainly because of the low-
skill nature of the work involved: around 48% and 44% of migrants coming to Belgium and Germany 
respectively is lowly-skilled (Platonova and Urso, 2012: 11). The segregated nature of physically-
demanding production work is reflected in predominantly male workforces in all plants, especially 
among agency workers, who are generally used for manual jobs, while women are to be found mainly 
in administrative positions. This implies that the share of female agency workers is insignificant in all 
plants. The similarity in terms of union presence across the workplaces allowed us to compare local 
union attitudes towards temporary agency work, alongside the segmentation and other social effects 
produced at the workplaces. Data are based on case studies conducted in 2011/2012. The study 
incorporates 35 semi-structured interviews with EU- and local human resource managers, national and 
sectoral trade unions officers, local union representatives and works councillors. Interviews took 
between 90-120 minutes and were recorded and transcribed. NVivo was used for qualitative data 
analysis. Company-based documentary materials and collective agreements were analysed as secondary 
sources. 
Secondly, and given that the case studies show a higher degree of dualisation in Germany than in 
Belgium despite the similar external (market) and internal (firm) characteristics, a further empirical step 
attempted to investigate the reasons of this diversity. It explored how the German unions dealt internally 
with the representation of ‘outsiders’ such as temporary and migrant workers. Therefore five interviews 
with the main German trade unions (the DGB confederation, and the sectoral unions IG Metall, IG BAU 
and Ver.di) were carried out in 2010-12 as one part of a larger six-country study, and complementary 




Not all workers are the same: Trade unions and agency work in Belgium and Germany  
All investigated workplaces used a quota to limit the number of agency workers. However, the processes 
through which the diverse thresholds were locally negotiated differ between Belgium and Germany.  
In 2005 MetalGermany implemented a quota for blue collar agency workers of 15% of the total plant 
headcount, and 40% during the holiday periods. By negotiating a quota, the work council intended not 
only to simply limit the use of agency work, but also to reduce the bureaucratic efforts agency work 
caused for the work council itself. National legislation (§ 14(3) AÜG) in Germany obliges management 
to inform the works council about the utilization of agency workers. The 15%-quota, by removing the 
information requirement up to the agreed threshold, made agency work became more accessible. The 
relatively high quota allowed the company to benefit from labour cost savings, as the price of agency 
work in Germany is lower than that of regularly employed workers. The savings contributed to the 
survival of the plant, its competitiveness and the security of the core workforce, if at the cost of visible 
inequity: 
 
“Employees from agencies only receive 7-8 Euros. In contrast to our ordinary employees, agency 
workers do not get any extra payments. It is difficult to motivate someone to do a good job when the 
rest gets far more money for the same work.” 
 (Works councillor, MetalGermany) 
 
In 2004, a 20% agency work threshold was negotiated in MachineGermany. Thereby, the works council 
attempted to exchange the employers’ request for higher external flexibility with employment 
guarantees for the core workforce. The plant had faced intensive restructuring, and the risk of closure 
was mitigated by cutting almost 150 jobs. The works council had pushed for an employment guarantee 
in 2003, which was eventually implemented in exchange for the 20% agency work quota. Therefore, the 
risk of plant closure was reduced not only by the high level of external flexibility, but also by lower 
labour costs. 
In substance, both MachineGermany and MetalGermany coped with economic uncertainly by protecting 
regular workers while increasing flexibility at the margins. Thus, the works councils in MetalGermany 
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and MachineGermany were formally negotiating agency work quotas, but were at the same time 
engaged in concession bargaining highlighting their reduced power at the workplace. Works councils 
would have needed to incorporate the interests of the agency workers into their strategies to moderate 
the consequences of the use of temporary labour. In this perspective, negotiating a quota can be seen as 
a necessary but not sufficient condition to alleviating the leverage of a protected workforce. Concession 
bargaining in the German workplaces secured the regular workforce’s employment at the expense of 
hiring a relatively large amount of ‘cheap’ agency workers. Consequently, ‘dualisation’ effects could be 
observed, reducing opportunities for agency workers to gain access to regular employment. Overall, the 
plant-level agreements concluded at MetalGermany and MachineGermany contain ‘productivity-
oriented’ concessions. Accepting more external flexibility which offers a ‘security net’ for the core 
workforce may be a strategic response of the German works councillors to save jobs while contributing 
to the competitiveness of the firm (AUTHOR A and AUTHOR C, 2013).   
As in Germany, union representatives in both Belgian workplaces agreed on an agency work threshold 
with management. However, the thresholds were much lower and the social dynamics put in place prone 
to deliver greater equality between regular and agency workers. At MetalBelgium, the local unions 
agreed on a 15% flexibility quota, including 10% fixed-term and 5% agency work in 2004. They pushed 
for an agreement to keep the use of flexible forms of work at a low level and in so doing, avoiding the 
abuse of agency work: 
 
“We need to have 85% permanent contracts, 10 % temporary and 5% agency workers. If management 
uses a higher number of agency or fixed-term workers they have to compensate by offering permanent 
or fixed-term contracts to a certain share of workers in return.”  
 (Work councillor, MetalBelgium) 
 
From the firm perspective, hiring staff via a work agency corresponds to an extended probation period 
for workers. If the worker performs well in this period, the company would normally offer a fixed-term 
contract; and after two years, permanent employment.  
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In MachineBelgium the local union representatives negotiated an agreement on the ban of agency work 
in 2007. In exchange, the unions accepted a more extensive use of fixed-term contracts (up to 20% of 
the workforce). The unions’ approval of the 20% fixed-term contract quota was a precondition for 
management to refrain from using agency work in the first place. Likewise temporary contracts are a 
means of screening workers for permanent positions, and lower the cost of dismissing those who are 
unproductive. At the same time, the unions ensured that the flexible arrangements did not result in job 
instability by negotiating new procedures on company recruitment and on training provision. 
Specifically, people employed on temporary contracts would be upgraded to permanent ones over time, 
subject to performance indicators and periods of intensive on-the-job and general training. In both 
Belgian workplaces, union representatives and management agreed on providing training for all 
employees regardless of their contractual status: 
 
“When a worker enters the company, he has two to three weeks initial training, and then there is regular 
training on-the-job. Additionally, during the first six months, the worker is followed by a trainer, by the 
supervisor and by what we call the team lead which would be the tutor. So at this stage, we offer training 
and coaching for everyone.” 
 (HR Manager, MachineBelgiumMachineBelgium) 
 
MetalBelgium considered investing in specific training as pivotal to retaining a skilled workforce. This 
had process-related advantages for the company and it contributed to maintaining cooperative relations 
with the workforce, in turn leading to a high level of internal mobility: 
 
“We have the task to invest in our people and train them no matter which contract they have. What is 
important is the potential of our people.”  
 (HR Manager, MetalBelgium) 
 
The need to guarantee internal job stability and avoid plant closure explains the absence of formalized 
career progression procedures for agency workers in both German workplaces. In Belgium, however, 
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the unions engaged in company-level negotiations on career paths for agency workers and on their 
working conditions. The highly centralised framework, the strong Belgian unions’ bargaining and 
representation position together with the legal restriction of derogating from the equality principle may 
explain why agreements on career paths could be negotiated. Furthermore, management saw the benefits 
of using flexible arrangements to screen workers hired through temporary agencies. This is different in 
Germany, since the relatively cheap price of agency work hardly encouraged management to offer fixed-
term or permanent contracts to agency workers.  
In the German workplaces, the acceptance of agency work occurred under the threat of plant closure 
and job losses so that agency work became instrumental to providing job protection for the regular 
workforce. In Belgium, however, the local unions gained control over the plant-level regulation of 
agency work by retaining a relatively small agency workforce. This implied that better working 
conditions, including career progression, could be locally negotiated. The findings suggest that unions’ 
different degree of intervention as a political actor in the regulation of the employment relationship at 
the Belgian and German workplaces concurred to shape different working conditions while influencing 
segmentation at the workplace.  
 
Not all agency workers are the same: a closer look at migrant agency workers  
Case studies reveal that across comparable workplaces in the metalworking sector, the gap in 
employment conditions between core and agency workers is greater in Germany than in Belgium, and 
trade unions appear to struggle to control it. According to Hassel (2007, 2012), German unions’ sectoral 
organisations and reliance on institutional resources make them badly positioned, in comparison to their 
European counterparts, to organise new or expanding categories of workers, especially women and the 
young. However, Belgian unions also rely largely on institutional resources, but their action is different. 
It is therefore necessary to investigate to what extent, and why, German unions, and more specifically 
IG Metall as the main German union examined here, have a distinctive segmentation effect. To do so, 
we look more in depth at the group of outsiders that is easiest to single out, namely migrant workers and 
workers with a migration background. This group is over-represented among agency workers in 
Germany: they are twice as likely to be found among agency workers and even three times as likely if 
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they are non-EU citizens (data: German Statistical Office). According to IG Metall (our interviews), 
among low-skilled agency workers in metalworking, 70% are  migrants or have a migration background. 
The percentage is slightly lower in Belgium, although the mining and metal sectors are traditionally the 
ones with the highest concentration of low-skilled migrant workers (Platonova and Urso, 2012).      
Being challenged by agency work, trade unions face a similar dilemma regarding migrant workers: shall 
they resist or co-operate, and should they treat them equally or in a special way (Penninx and Roosblad, 
2000). In the period of the Gastarbeiter schemes (1955-1973), during which immigrants from Southern 
Europe found employment mostly in manufacturing, German unions defended equal treatment of 
foreign employees, and in particular IG Metall was very quick in organising, informing and servicing 
the large inflows of foreign workers, setting up specific departments for this purpose (Kühne, 2000). At 
company-level, exclusionary and discriminatory practices by works councils were initially frequent, but 
over time, foreign workers also started to make up an increasing share of union officers, representatives 
and works council members: by the mid-2000s, between 4.5% and 5% of works council members were 
migrants in the manufacturing sector’s unions IG Metall, IG BCE (mining, chemical and energy), IG 
BAU (construction, agriculture and environment), and young workers with an immigration background 
were twice as likely to be unionised than Germans of the same age (DGB, 2008). In terms of 
unionisation, according to ESS data, the gap between nationals and migrants is in Germany one of the 
smallest in the EU (20% vs. 18%), and much smaller than in Belgium (51% vs. 33%) (Gorodzeisky and 
Richards, 2013). The German unions, and most of all IG Metall, have specific structures as well as 
migrant committees (Migrationsaussschüsse). Moreover, a relatively high number of migrants and 
workers with migration background have shop steward and works council representation roles; in the 
case of IG Metall, there are about 400 works council chairpersons. The Belgian unions have followed a 
similar development. Soon after the Second World War, the Belgian unions’ discourse focused on the 
promotion of equal treatment and opportunities for workers, anti-racism, the promotion of citizenship 
and social clauses against discrimination at work (Martens and Author A, 2008). Over time, the Belgian 
unions stepped up their engagement against racism and discrimination, and for the regularisation of 
migrant work. From 1947 onwards, they established separate migrant structures as a reflection of their 
inclusive policy (Schandevyl, 2010).   
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In the light of this picture, it is therefore difficult to explain the weaker protection of migrants (especially 
agency workers) in Germany as an effect of their under-representation among union members, 
particularly if confronted with Belgium where different priorities, traditions and identities of the migrant 
community did seem to have merged less well together within the nation’s trade union model 
(Schandevyl, 2010: 359). This is confirmed by our case studies: one of the works councillors in 
MetalGermany is originally Turkish and particularly dedicated to representing the numerous Turkish 
employees, especially as a number of them do not speak German. In the Belgian case studies, language 
is less of an issue because French is used as a lingua franca between the mostly French-speaking Flemish 
representatives and migrants, who are mostly of Moroccan origin and have sufficient French language 
skills.  
Both Belgian and German unions repeatedly stress that they are not opposed to migrant workers as such, 
but rather resist the idea of temporary immigration, especially if through posting, agencies and 
movement of services; they instead prefer integration initiatives (especially training) for those who are 
already in the host country, as well as stronger regulation of the labour market. Before the 2004 EU 
enlargement, German unions tacitly supported the government’s decision to introduce temporary 
limitations to the employment of citizens from the new member states, and their extension to the latest 
possible date, namely 2011. Belgium lifted the restrictions in 2009, although the unions declared to 
strongly oppose the policy of importing workers from EU and non-EU countries on a large scale. The 
transitional arrangements appear to have had some negative consequences in terms of channelling 
foreign workers to even more vulnerable forms of work in both countries, confirming the limitations of 
exclusionary policies that have been detected in our case studies. Following the end of the transitional 
arrangements in 2011, the main union response in Germany was the demand for minimum wages, that 
have been introduced in a number of sectors, such as construction, cleaning, care, postal service and 
eventually in temporary agencies, and finally at national level from 2015 onwards. 
Given o the similarity of subjective engagement for outsiders between German and Belgian unions, 
understanding the differences in company negotiations requires a deeper consideration of the 
institutional contexts. Unlike in Belgium, German unionists pointed to the possibility  of concluding 
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different, and worse, collective agreements for agency work as a separate sector, as the reason for their 
weakness: 
 
“So far, to the extent that we have addressed the issue [of agency work], we have also received a lot of 
support from the core workforce. They too want that agency workers are treated in the same way. The 
problem is that if we want to include agency workers, we must also change the legislation. The pressure 
we have exerted on the government has not led to this.”  
(IG Metall officer) 
 
The prominence of the political action on the part of the Belgian unions and their ability to reach formal 
agreements with the government and the employer associations to regulate employment was facilitated 
by their institutional embeddedness. On the one hand, the tradition of consensual policy-making allowed 
these unions to obtain gains for all represented target groups at national level as well as in the workplace 
through union-dominated works councils. On the other hand, the Ghent system provides Belgian unions 
with more resources and organisational interest in defending unemployment insurance as a key channel 
for maintaining high unionisation, especially among precarious workers for whom unemployment 
insurance is more important. The strong presence of Belgian unions in workplaces makes it comparably 
easy to contact migrant agency workers, to recruit them and to become acquainted with their real 
interests. Different membership and collective bargaining power resources, then, affect the negotiation 
processes at workplace level in the two countries.   
 
Conclusion  
The comparison of Belgian and German plants of multinationals revealed important country differences 
with regard to the treatment and protection of agency workers. Notably, Belgian unions negotiate more 
equal treatment of agency worker, and stricter limits to their use. By considering the actors’ perspectives 
and the institutional contexts, we draw three important theoretical implications to sociological debates 
on dualisation by adding a contextualised micro-political perspective to them. First, dualisation follows 
a political rather than an economic logic: the differences between plants follow country lines (Germany 
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or Belgium) rather than sector (machinery or metalworking) ones, after having kept company 
organisational factors constant (the same two multinationals). This points to the importance of political 
games and social settings. This is confirmed when we compare the two companies across the two 
countries. The Belgian cases, in particular, show that dualisation is not an unavoidable outcome for co-
ordinated market economies (Rueda, 2014), as in certain conditions the unions can effectively reduce 
inequality between insiders and outsiders. Secondly, and relatedly, it confirms the argument of Palier 
and Thelen (2010) that segmentation is not a first choice but, at most, a second-best option for unions 
that no longer have the strength (as the Belgian ones appear to do) to protect all workers with 
encompassing regulations. The crucial variable here is the sphere of power relations between employers 
and employees, which explain workforce segmentation more than organisational efficiency imperatives 
do. Thirdly, it adds more precision to the argument by jointly assessing the role of institutions and agency 
in mediating different union approaches. The delaying and excluding option has been common for 
German unions on both agency and migrant work, and this has often resulted in the outsiders being 
channelled in less regulated jobs outside union control. German unions do have particularly segmented 
membership (Hassel 2007). However, this is itself linked to institutional factors (in particular industry-
level bargaining) rather than choice, and does not systematically correspond to dualisation lines: the 
unionisation gap between nationals and migrants, who are hugely over-represented among agency 
workers, is in Germany one of the lowest in the EU, and lower than in Belgium. Our overall argument 
can therefore be summarised as ‘agency within power relations’. 
The overall argument is reflected in the policy implications: unions do have space for strategic choice, 
yet they should pay particular attention to the institutional setting. In the last few years, following the 
economic crisis of 2009 and the opening of the German labour market to citizens from the new EU 
member states in 2011, German unions have actually changed their policies and stepped up their 
commitment to outsiders significantly. Their campaigns for agency workers have however only had 
satisfactory results in the few situations where they are strongest, such as in the steel industry and in the 
state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Our analysis suggests that the failure to prevent dualisation in 
Germany is linked to specific unfavourable legal and political contexts, and notably the less binding and 
encompassing nature of minimum wages, sectoral agreements and welfare, in comparison to Belgium. 
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A German union strategy against dualisation should focus on exploiting the current labour market power 
(low unemployment) to modify those contexts. Some first steps and results in this direction are visible 
in the presence of union-friendly points in the programme of the government elected in 2013, including 
a national minimum wage, an easier extension of collective bargaining, and limits to fringe unions’ 
collective bargaining prerogatives.  
This conclusion on the importance of the macro-political context confirms the argument by Clegg 
(2012), who discussed a similar difference in protecting outsiders in Belgium and France. The stronger 
effectiveness of Belgian unions to provide unemployment insurance for atypical workers, he argued, 
was not the result of any more commitment to the outsiders: if anything, French unions were politically 
more committed. But institutional factors, and notably the Ghent system provided Belgian unions with 
more resources and organisational capacity.  
Our findings have the usual representativeness limitations of case studies and of accounts of rapidly 
changing developments. Nonetheless, the robustness of the comparison and the consideration of the 
context allow us to make a contribution on the role of macro political factors in affecting union 
approaches to atypical work, and to draw two general lessons. First, the delaying and exclusionary 
attitudes of unions, even when they may appear rational, are short-sighted and leave the organisations 
badly positioned in the longer-run. Secondly, while grassroots organising and negotiating strategies may 
be important, effective union protection of atypical workers is arduous without favourable legal and 
political frameworks; as such protection is not only in the interest of the unions, but also of policy makers 
who want to avoid the social stability dangers of dualisation. Thereby, policies that promote collective 
bargaining coverage and the unionisation of outsiders should receive strong consideration.  
Notes 
1) During the 2000s, the OECD EPL Indicator  (which measures the legal protection from dismissals) 
collapsed for temporary contracts (from 3.125 to 1), but increased slightly for regular contracts (from 
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Table 1: Overview of the workplaces  
 MachineBelgium
MachineBelgium  
MachineGermany  MetalBelgium MetalGermany 
Country of origin USA USA 
Employees  About 130,000 About 24,000 
Employees per 
site 
2,500 1,700 1,600 1,500 
Blue collar 1,400 850 1,000 900 
White collar 1,100 850 600 600 
Share of women 
 - in the plant’s 
workforce 











Share of migrants 












IG Metall ACV-CSC 
ACLVB-CGSLB 
ABVV-FGTB  
IG Metall, CGM  
Unionization rate 95% 80% 95% 75% 
Threshold agency 
workers 
No agency work - 
20% fixed-term 
workers 
20% 5% 15% (40% during 
holiday seasons) 
 
 
 
 
 
